Photo by Egor Myznik on Unsplash
Alban Zohn
University of New Haven
Match-fixing stands at the forefront of criminal threats to sport. The European Convention on the Manipulation of Sport Events (Macolin Convention) recommended that countries update their laws to incorporate match-fixing as a specified criminal offense. This change was deemed necessary, because relying on fraud, bribery, and other pre-existing statutes according to various legal analyses may be insufficient at addressing the full scope of match-fixing behavior. More than 30 countries have followed this recommendation and added match-fixing as a specified criminal offense. The United States has not followed suit, and instead still relies on pre-existing statutes, such as the Sport Bribery Act, to regulate match-fixing. This policy brief is an attempt to evaluate whether the existing policies in the United States are sufficient for addressing match-fixing offenses, and it is intended for United States policymakers to consider in improving legislative responses to match-fixing.
Statement of the Problem
This policy brief examines whether the United States should specify match-fixing as a criminal offence in their federal legal code, to better prosecute match-fixing incidents. Countries vary in their approaches to addressing match-fixing as a criminal offence, with those lacking the specification of match-fixing in their criminal code potentially hamstrung when attempting to prosecute match-fixing incidents. The United States problematically relies on laws that do not cover the full scope of match-fixing behavior. Changes to federal or state legislation could reduce the risk of match-fixing in the United States.
Background
The Council of Europe (2014) defines match-fixing as:
…an intentional arrangement, act, or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result of the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others.
This definition aims to cover the broad scope of manipulations, which includes but is not limited to manipulating the entire outcome of a competition, the score of the competition, and isolated elements of the competition unrelated to the outcome or score (Andreff, 2018; Huggins, 2018). Match-fixing is regulated in two spaces. Sport governing bodies apply disciplinary measures according to their own rules, and law enforcement authorities can impose legal sanctions in cases that violate criminal codes (Diaconu et al., 2021; Huggins, 2018). The scope of sanctions available to sport governing bodies includes bans, suspensions, fines, disqualifications of players, game annulment, point deductions, and relegations.
Relying upon sport governing bodies to address match-fixing alone is problematic due to the involvement of organized criminal networks in match-fixing cases. Sport governing bodies can impose bans and suspensions on players or sport officials, but they are unable to discipline criminal entities or individuals outside of sport that organize the manipulation from behind the scenes (Diaconu et al., 2021; Huggins, 2018). Involving law enforcement is a necessary measure to protect sport from such criminal exploitation; however, the relevant legislation varies widely between countries and potentially weakens their ability to respond to this threat. Some countries rely on fraud, bribery, extortion, or similar statues (Hallman et al., 2017), while others specify match-fixing as a criminal offense (International Olympic Committee, 2017). Sanctions also vary considerably. Australia, Greece, and Poland have imprisonment sentences of up to 10 years, while others, such as Denmark, have a maximum prison sentence of 1 year for match-fixing (Hallman et al., 2017).
The United States failing to specify match-fixing as a criminal offence is problematic (Holden & Rodenberg, 2016; Wyatt, 2023). The 2018 overturning of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), in Murphy vs National Collegiate Athletic Association (Wyatt, 2023), has changed the landscape of match-fixing in the USA by allowing states to freely regulate sport betting. High volume of betting activity facilitates match-fixing behavior because higher liquidity circulating in the betting market makes it more difficult to discover illicit bets (Andreff, 2018; Huggins, 2018). Additionally, betting options are almost limitless, ranging from the score of the game itself to the color of gloves worn by a player, which results in more opportunities for manipulations. Recent scandals highlight this elevated risk. To illustrate, Yuri Andrade streaked at Superbowl 2021 and almost won $400,000 off a prop bet placed on himself (Falcon, 2022), while NBA player Jontay Porter of the Toronto Raptors was banned for life in 2024 for placing bets on himself and providing insider information (Reynolds, 2024).
The United States is uniquely poised to suffer further match-fixing scandals, due to the structure of American professional sports. A high regular season position is only valuable in terms of the position it places a team for the playoffs, and winning the post-season playoffs is the most coveted sporting achievement possible (McManus, 2018). However, league position is crucial for the draft system that dictates how professional teams in the United States acquire incoming players into the league. During this draft, the order of picks is determined in reverse order of the league position, whereby the first pick is given to the team that finished bottom of the league. This supposedly ensures competitive advantage, allowing the weaker teams to bolster their squad with the most desirable incoming players to the league.
However, the high value placed on playoffs, and relatively less value placed on league position, results in a bizarre situation where teams with little to no chance of making playoffs at the midway or later part of the season are motivated to “tank” (McManus, 2018), or lose games on purpose, in order to finish in a lower league position that allows them to secure a more desirable draft pick in the following season. This system differs significantly from most of the world, where there are no playoffs and teams are relegated from their division to a lower category if they finish in the bottom places. Such extreme consequence from relegation makes it a situation teams are desperate to avoid. For example, relegation from the English Premier League leads to direct losses of roughly 100 million USD, and this does not consider the hidden costs such as job losses, star player exodus, and drop in merchandise sales (Dalleres, 2023).
Additionally, the popularity of intercollegiate sports is unique to the United States. These sports are attractive markets for match-fixing behavior, potentially even more attractive than the professional leagues (Campman, 2019). The high revenues of college football and basketball led to college athletes fighting to be compensated for their name, image, and likeness (Campman, 2019; Dees et al., 2021). The result has been highly lucrative sponsorship deals for elite college athletes. Overturning the PASPA has led to 29 states allowing online wagers for college sports (Goodling, 2024). This is problematic, because the population of athletes in college are those identified as highly motivated to match-fix: young, with short careers, and most earning little to nothing in comparison to their elite peers (Campman, 2019; Huggins, 2018). College athletes are also technically not employees, so some statutes in the United States legal framework (described below) are not applicable if they fix matches (Wyatt, 2023). Campman (2019) argues that the increase of the college sports betting market must be met with a strong policy response to reduce the risk of match-fixing.
Pre-Existing Policies
The laws that could combat match-fixing in the USA include the Sport Bribery Act (SBA), Travel Act, Interstate Wire Act, and the Wagering Paraphernalia Act (Wyatt, 2023; Holden & Rodenberg, 2016; Campman, 2019). Under federal law, match-fixing is most likely to be prosecuted under the Sports Bribery Act, which criminalizes bribing to manipulate sport events. The recent reversal of PASPA has limited the other three Acts because they only apply where sports betting is illegal, and they cannot apply between state lines if those states have conflicting laws related to the legalization of sports betting (Wyatt, 2023). This is increasingly problematic, as 38 states currently have legalized sports betting.
The SBA is arguably the most promising policy, given it allows the federal government to prosecute sports gambling crimes, regardless of whether the state prohibits gambling (Wyatt, 2023). However, the SBA does not cover extortion or tampering. Furthermore, the SBA and other policies fail to cover the full scope of match-fixing typology on their own, or even as a sum. For example, lone-wolf match-fixing, which does not involve bribes or communication with others, is not covered (Holden & Rodenberg, 2016). The example of 2008 NBA Referee Tim Donaghy, who admitted to betting on games he officiated (Walley, 2017), highlights the legislative weakness of current policy. Donaghy was convicted of wire fraud and transmitting wagering information through interstate commerce, but there was not enough evidence to prosecute him under the SBA. With states legalizing sports betting, the Wire Fraud Act might not even be applicable if Donaghy committed the same crime today. As summarized by Wyatt (2023), it remains unclear under which law match-fixing offenders can be prosecuted.
Policy Options
Legal analysis strongly suggests that specifying match-fixing as a criminal offense is necessary, because relying on bribery, fraud, and extortion statues proves insufficient at covering the full scope of match-fixing behavior (Hessert & Goh, 2022; Holden & Rodenberg, 2016). Relevant examples exist outside of the United States that specify match-fixing as a criminal offense (Hallman et al., 2017; Hessert & Goh, 2022), which serve to illustrate potential policy options for the United States. Australia provides an excellent example of a specific definition for match-fixing in their legal section 443A(1) of Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld). The language covers non-gambling related match-fixing and even can be applied to cases of lone-wolf match-fixing:
A person who engages in match-fixing conduct in relation to a sporting event or the happening of a sporting contingency for the purpose of
(a) Obtaining or receiving a pecuniary benefit for any person; or
(b) Causing a pecuniary detriment to another person; commits a crime.
There are three separate ways of incorporating such a specified criminal offense in the United States. First, signing with the Macolin Convention (2014) would obligate the United States to update their legal code to specify match-fixing as a criminal offense. Second, the United States could specify match-fixing as a criminal offense without signing the Convention. Finally, there remains a lingering consideration of whether to apply such a law federally or at the state level.
Option 1: Sign the Macolin Convention and make match-fixing a specified criminal offense.
The United States could follow the example of Australia as a non-European country and sign with the Macolin Convention. Effective as of 2019, the Macolin Convention aimed to coordinate the fight against match-fixing through a number of ways, including harmonizing laws related to match-fixing globally so that international cooperation could occur to deal with the transnational nature of the phenomena (Vandercruysse, 2022). Thus, those that sign the Convention are obligated to prove that their national legislation can criminally sanction the entire scope of match-fixing behavior, according to Article 15. Signing the Convention would obligate the United States to improve their legislation by including language that criminalizes the full typology of match-fixing behavior. This typology includes match-fixing where there is a private benefit to the opponent, a benefit to the perpetrator, and benefits with no pecuniary nature. Additionally, there should be an expressed mention of athletes, coaches, referees, judges, and arbiters who could all be responsible parties. The legislation must also apply to international cases, given match-fixing can involve transnational organized criminal groups.
Option 2: Make match-fixing a specified criminal offense without signing the Macolin Convention.
Signing the Convention is not necessary to improve match-fixing legislation. Signing the Convention restricts its members through strict obligations and fails to allow flexibility in drafting new legislation (Vandercruysse, 2022) The United States could take from the example of other countries across the EU that have not signed the Convention and instead use it as a guideline for drafting or updating legislation. The United States could add a specified criminal offense into federal law that prohibits match-fixing and the misuse of insider information or update the existing SBA. This option should be informed by the suggestions of legal analyses of Wyatt (2023) and Holden and Rodenberg (2016), which provide comprehensive overviews of why the current legislation is insufficient and provide detailed suggestions for improving the legislation in the United States. Wyatt (2023) proposes a model law:
- Bribery, offering: No person shall offer to confer, promise to confer, or confer any benefit or thing of value to a person with the ability or authority, by virtue of their employment, to affect a sport match’s outcome or margin of victory or defeat.
- Bribery, soliciting: No person, with the ability or authority by virtue of their employment, shall solicit, promise to accept, or accept any benefit or thing of value in consideration for or pursuant to an understanding for that person to affect a sport match’s outcome or margin of victory or defeat.
- Extortion: No person shall threaten, with the intent to influence a sport match’s outcome or margin of victory or defeat, any detriment to a participant, official, or other person with the ability or authority, by virtue of their employment, to affect a sport match’s outcome or margin of victory or defeat, or to otherwise manipulate the match for the person’s material gain. For the purposes of this section, “detriment” shall include either physical or financial detriment, including physical or financial detriment to the person’s relatives or members of their household.
- Use of Nonpublic Information:
- No person shall directly or indirectly place or conspire to place a sports wager if the person has received nonpublic information relevant to the wager’s subject.
- No person shall increase or decrease a wager after obtaining nonpublic information relevant to the wager’s subject.
- Tampering:
- No person shall tamper or cause another person or thing to tamper with any person, animal, or thing with the intent to influence a sport game’s outcome, margin of victory or defeat, or to obtain any material gain.
- No player shall knowingly or intentionally refrain from using his best efforts with the intent to obtain any material gain.
- No officiant or referee shall knowingly or intentionally refrain from using his neutral and impartial judgment with the intent to obtain any material gain.
Option 3: Rather than relying on federal law, states could individually make match-fixing a specified criminal offense.
In this new legislative field of legalized sports betting, Wyatt (2023) specifically proposes that states should independently address match-fixing in their gambling laws, because the current federal protection against the threat is insufficient. Currently, state law varies in terms of how they deal with match-fixing. However, states have the power to regulate the issue themselves, regardless of federal law. Given the interstate issue of conflicting laws, there should be a priority placed on harmonizing the laws across state lines. Otherwise, sanctions across state lines will vary, and manipulators may target certain states with weak legislation. States could use the model law proposed by Wyatt (2023) in Option 2 as a framework for drafting new legislation or updating current policy.
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Policy Options
Evidence suggests specialized legislation will result in more success with prosecutions of match-fixing cases, as evidenced in other countries that have taken such measures (Hallman et al., 2017; Holden & Rodenberg, 2016; Wyatt, 2023). Improving the current policy in the United States should result in future cases of match-fixing leading to in criminal prosecution. This would work towards protecting the integrity of sport and preserving the unpredictability of outcome that gives sport special value (McManus, 2018; McNamee, 2013). Violating sports integrity through match-fixing also impacts the economic interests of the sports industry, because sponsors, fans, and players shun competitions marred by corruption (Masters, 2015). Leagues have dissolved in Southeast Asia from match-fixing due to these reasons (Holden & Rodenberg, 2016).
Successful criminal prosecutions that result in severe punishments may deter potential match-fixing offenders. However, measuring such a deterrent effect of a specified criminal offense proves difficult. There exists an empirical gap in terms of measuring the precise perceived risk of criminals from the change in a particular sanction regime, such as when there was a change in policies related to the death penalty (Nagin, 2013). Nagin (2013) explains that research on this topic is difficult due to the practical issues of collecting longitudinal data on the relevant population of potential offenders. Isolating the perceived risk change of potential offenders because of a change in match-fixing legislation faces similar challenges.
There are additional practical difficulties involved with changing legislation. Identifying the specific language to cover the full typology remains a challenge because of the complexity of match-fixing behavior and the range of actors involved (Masters, 2015). This is a problem at the state and federal levels. Even if states are willing to change their laws, if some fail to define the law properly, or do not adopt any law at all, then criminals can target the states with weaker or nonexistent regulations. Relying on state regulation is risky, given it is unlikely all states will harmonize their match-fixing laws. Changing the federal law has its advantages because it can apply regardless of state laws. However, some countries rely on pre-existing laws on bribery, fraud, and corruption, because supposedly these laws are sufficient for addressing match-fixing (Huggins, 2018). United States officials may argue similarly and believe current federal legislation is sufficient.
Signing the Macolin Convention also deserves closer consideration. There are benefits to signing the Convention beyond the obligation to improve legislation against match-fixing. Politically, there are benefits acknowledged by Hessert and Goh (2022). The Convention allows for transnational support on cases that involve actors in different countries, and similarly the member countries of the Convention aim to work in harmony in terms of adopting strategies related to reporting and education that the Convention provides. Signing the convention also demonstrates a commitment by the United States that they take the issue seriously, an important signal of intent to the wider global community. This matters because the United States is recognized as a global power politically and in sport. Their influence on a global scale cannot be overlooked, and as such their signing of the Convention could provide a spark that fulfills the goal of the Convention in that it would push other countries around the world to sign.
As more countries sign the Convention, the international hub of support against match-fixing grows, and the global response improves. The United States could play a pivotal role in the fight against match-fixing globally by signing the Convention, but there are certain drawbacks to doing so. For example, they could be punished for not implementing the updated specified laws as obligated by Article 15 of the Convention. Such punishments could include not allowing the United States to host major sporting events (Vandercruysse et al., 2022). Overall, signing the Convention limits the flexibility of the approach of the United States in terms of updating their policy to address match-fixing.
Recommendations
The United States must update their policy to better address match-fixing, and they should do so through signing the Convention. The United States would then be obligated to adopt a specified federal criminal offense for match-fixing, which would apply regardless of individual state laws. Wyatt’s (2023) excellent model could be applied as a guideline for the language that the United States should use to update their federal law to ensure that the policy covers the variety of match-fixing behavior. A sentencing framework that increases the severity of punishment for match-fixing should also be considered in this updated policy. Sport actors who carry out the fix should face prison sentences of up to 10 years, as in the example of Australia, with higher punishments for those that organize the fixes compared to those who are victims of criminal exploitation in carrying out the fixes. Despite the difficulty of measuring deterrence, there is still plenty of empirical and theoretical support for the deterrent effect of swift, certain, and severe punishments for a criminal offense, particularly with regard to certainty (Nagin, 2013). If there were successful cases of match-fixing prosecutions as a result of this new policy, then deterrence theory supports that potential offenders would hesitate to commit the same offense.
Signing the Convention is important beyond the resulting update of the existing policy to address legislative weakness in the United States. The signal of intent would send a clear message to sport stakeholders and potential offenders alike that the phenomena is taken seriously. Additionally, as explained above, the political weight of the United States coupled with their significance in the global world of sport makes their signing particularly significant. Acknowledging the fallacy of a slippery slope argument, an optimistic view would maintain that the United States joining the Convention could push other countries to sign due to their global profile. If there was such an impact, the global fight against match-fixing is strengthened in a manner as yet unheard, because member countries can harmonize their policies, cooperate on cases, and share information as well as best practices. The result is an improvement in global efforts to discover, investigate, prosecute, and prevent match-fixing across the world. A strong position holds the United States as morally obligated to sign the Convention, due to this potential impact on the global fight against match-fixing.
References
Andreff, W. (2018). Different types of manipulation in sport. In M. Breuer & D. Forrest
(Eds.), The palgrave handbook on the economics of manipulation in sport (pp.13–
35. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-77389-6_2
Provides an overview of match-fixing, with a focus on how match-fixing is a threat to sport integrity overall. Different types of manipulations are covered, which provides a useful reference for understanding the broad scope of match-fixing typology.
Campman, T. (2019). Addressing match fixing and corruption in collegiate athletics in light of NCAA v. Murphy. Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L., 36, 477.
Campman analyzes the overturning of the PASPA ACT and what it means for NCAA sports, in relation to match-fixing risk. The author implores states to take the risk of match-fixing in NCAA sports seriously, discussing the importance of creating laws that can control match-fixing in order to compensate for the elevated risk as a result of the reversal of the PASPA Act.
Dalleres, F. (2023, May 27). What is the cost of relegation from the Premier League? City A.M. https://www.cityam.com/what-is-the-cost-of-relegation-from-the-premier-league/
A short news article outlining the potential costs of relegation from the top division of the English soccer pyramid.
Dees, W., Cianfrone, B., & Andrew, D. (2021). Show me the money! A review of current issues in
the new NIL era. Journal of Applied Sport Management, 13(2), 2.
Article expands on the various issues that face college sports now that athletes can be compensated for their name, image, and likeness. The article primarily focuses on the challenges that arise in this new era of college sports, with a view towards what it means for the future of sponsorship in college athletics.
Diaconu, M., Kuwelkar, S., & Kuhn, A. (2021). The court of arbitration for sport jurisprudence on
match-fixing: a legal update. The International Sports Law Journal, 21(1), 27-46.
An overview of the efforts of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) against match-fixing. It provides an overview of the legal landscape, CAS jurisprudence, and also helpfully provides the details of sanctions and how they differ across countries. The article provides a useful tool for understanding the strengths and limitations of sport arbitration against match-fixing.
Falcon, R. (2022, February 12). Super Bowl streaker: What happened to Yuri Andrade? News Nation Now. https://www.newsnationnow.com/us-news/super-bowl-streaker-what-happened-to-yuri-andrade/
A news article that details the outcome of Yuri Andrade, who profited from a prop bet that hinged on a streaker at the Super Bowl.
Goodling, N. (2024, May 1). Where you can bet on college sports: 2024 guide to state betting rules. The Philadelphia Inquirer. https://www.inquirer.com/sports/betting/college-football/where-can-you-bet-on-college-sports.html
News article that reviews the betting regulations for college sports in every state of the United
States. Details for how to place bets, whether online or retail bets are offered, and a case-by-case analysis of each state is provided. Potential restrictions on betting behavior for college sports are also discussed.
Hallman, K., Moritzer, S., Orlainsky, M., Naydenova, K., & Fürst, F. (2017). Mach-fixing and legal systems: An analysis of selected legal systems in Europe and worldwide with special emphasis on disciplinary and criminal consequences for corruption in sport and match-fixing. German Sport University Cologne: Institute of Sport Economics and Sport Management.
A detailed analysis of the legal frameworks of countries in how they criminalize match-fixing behavior. The article explains how and why countries differ in the legislation they use to prosecute match-fixing incidents, and it importantly highlights the benefits of specifying match-fixing as a criminal offense. The document provides a detailed explanation of the Macolin Convention and analyzes the legal situation in 10 countries, not including the United States.
Hessert, B., & Goh, C. L. (2022). A comparative case study of match-fixing laws in Singapore, Australia, Germany, and Switzerland. Asian Journal of Comparative Law, 17(2), 286-304.
In a similar example to the one considered in this brief, the authors analyzed the regulatory framework of Singapore, which similar to the USA does not specify match-fixing as a criminal offence, and they concluded that a specialized match-fixing offence would be beneficial, as well as signing the Macolin Convention. It provides an analogous example to the argument presented here in this brief.
Holden, J. T., & Rodenberg, R. M. (2016). Lone-wolf match-fixing: global policy
considerations. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 9(1), 137-151.
These authors argue lone-wolf match-fixing is a more worrying risk compared to organized crime-initiated match-fixing because of significant legislative gaps. In their article they compare the legislation from multiple countries, and they present an overview of the United States legislative framework. In doing so, they show how the United States legislation is weak when it comes to addressing lone-wolf match-fixing and argue that changes must be made.
Huggins, M. (2018). Match-fixing: A historical perspective. The International Journal of the History of Sport, 1–18. doi:10.1080/09523367.2018.1476341
An excellent overview of the history of match-fixing and how it has developed into an international problem. The full scope of match-fixing behavior is examined with a discussion of the risk factors and motivations for these offences. The various legal, ethical, and social threats are presented, in addition to an analysis of how these threats are mitigated in various contexts. This article presents a useful overview of how match-fixing is dealt with by sport governing bodies, as well as by law enforcement authorities.
International Olympic Committee & United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2017). Criminal
law provisions for the prosecution of competition manipulation.
This source provides an overview of countries efforts to address match-fixing, outlining the differences between legislation of various countries. The source also provides a detailed description of the Macolin Convention before considering the legal framework in 28 different countries, including the United States. Recommendations are made based on the comparative analysis.
Masters, A. (2015). Corruption in sport: From the playing field to the field of policy.
Policy and Society, 34(2), 111–123.
Masters argues that sport in the 21st century is dominated by criminalization given the enormous revenue stream in sport. The difficulties of dealing with such crime is described as an issue of law enforcement addressing a domain that holds self-governance sacred. The article is a fantastic source for examining the breadth and depth of corruption in modern sport, as well as the challenges these issues face for policy makers.
McManus, J. (2018). Ethical considerations & the practice of tanking in sport management. Sport,
Ethics and Philosophy, 13(2). 145-160. doi:10.1080/17511321.2018.1483418
A consideration of tanking behaviour in sport. The article provides a working definition, useful background of incidents, why it occurs, explains why it is ethically problematic, and considers methods of addressing it.
McNamee, M. (2013). The integrity of sport: Unregulated gambling, match fixing and corruption.
Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 7(2), 173–174. doi:10.1080/17511321.2013.791159
Integrity in sport and the value sport provides through competition is examined in detail by McNamee. Match-fixing is presented here in terms of its harm to the integrity of sport, moving the discussion beyond merely the damage it does to the sport industry. The ethical harm to its competitors and the spirit of sport is importantly examined.
Nagin, D. S. (2013). Deterrence: A review of the evidence by a criminologist for economists. Annu. Rev. Econ., 5(1), 83-105.
In this review of deterrence research, Nagin outlines the challenges associated with measuring the
effect of deterrence in policy change, such as with the death penalty. Evidence of law enforcement
measures and their impact on deterrence are examined.
Reynolds, T. (2024, April 17). NBA bans Jontay Porter after gambling probe shows he shared information, bet on games. PBS. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/arts/nba-bans-jontay-porter-after-gambling-probe-shows-he-shared-information-bet-on-games#:~:text=Toronto%20Raptors%20two%2Dway%20player,on%20the%20Raptors%20to%20lose.
A news article that provides an overview of the Jay Porter gambling scandal in the NBA.
Vandercruysse, L., Vermeersch, A., & Vander Beken, T. (2022). Macolin and beyond: Legal and
regulatory initiatives against match manipulation. The International Sports Law Journal, 22(3), 241-258.
A comprehensive overview of the Macolin Convention, describing the guidelines and obligations that the Convention sets out. It also considers other initiatives taken globally and nationally to address match-fixing, highlighting specific organizations that have taken it upon themselves to better fight the problem. The paper provides a useful review of the efforts of sport organizations and governments against match-fixing.
Walley, P. D. (2017). Officially gambling: Tim Donaghy and the NBA’s need for an absolute ban
on referee gambling. Gaming Law Review and Economics, 21(1), 36-43.
Uses the case of NBA referee Tim Donaghy to argue that there should be a blanket ban on referees gambling in sports. The article provides a detailed description of the case, including why it was so difficult to prosecute. A juxtaposition between the NBA’s stance on gambling and their efforts to enforce it is presented. The author concludes that if gambling is legalized in the United States (which has occurred in the time after this article was written), then referees should not be allowed to gamble.
Wyatt, A. T. (2023). Protecting America’s Favorite Pastime: An Analysis of Match-Fixing Laws in
States with Legal Sports Gambling. Loy. LAL Rev., 56, 1431.
This legal analysis of states and federal law shows specifically where the gaps are related to match-fixing behavior. In addition, Wyatt (2023) proposes a useful model law that he believes states should adopt, which shows how the United States could cover the full extent of match-fixing typology. The discussions in this analysis provide justification for the necessity of making legislative change.